The European Commission’s seventh annual Rule of Law Report was published late on a Friday afternoon in the middle of the summer. Intended to monitor developments and identify emerging issues before they deteriorate, the value of the Report lies in giving rule of law concerns political visibility, and that scrutiny is coupled with technical support. Governments do engage with, and challenge the findings, but as the Liberties’ 2026 Gap Analysis finds, this doesn’t translate into meaningful reforms.

Continued implementation gap

The 2026 Report is the fifth Commission report to include country recommendations aimed at repairing rule of law breaches. However, given the persistent downward democratic decline with minimal progress, as the findings of Liberties’ own annual rule of law report show, there has been mounting scepticism of the efficacy of the Commission’s Rule of Law Reporting Cycle as a tool to address and prevent rule of law decline, rather than merely document it.

In our Gap Analysis, Liberties assesses the 2026 Report’s progress by taking stock of the implementation rates of Member State recommendations. By all accounts, the results are woeful. In 2026, at least 96% of the recommendations assessed by the Commission had not been implemented, while more than half of the recommendations (54%) showed no or only limited progress. 96% of the recommendations issued in 2026 were also carried over from previous reporting cycles, with a significant number tracing back to 2022. Germany is one example: the recommendation on reforming the framework governing the tax-exempt status of non-profit organisations has shown ‘no progress’ since 2022, with indications suggesting no intention for reform.

Roughly one third of all recommendations consistently show no progress, indicating either a lack of political will or a deeply entrenched problem. In both cases, simply repeating the recommendation, without clear benchmarks or consequences, is unlikely to yield results. Instead of acting as a catalyst for reform, the reporting cycle risks becoming a mechanical exercise: the Commission identifies a problem, repeats the recommendation, records limited progress and returns to the same issue the following year. Liberties had hoped that the new Commission and leadership of Commissioner Michael McGrath would lead to substantive improvements, but with this year’s edition being the second report under his guidance, it appears to be business as usual with only superficial changes implemented.

Inadequate preventive response

The problem is not limited to countries where rule of law concerns are already well established. Denmark and Sweden show another weakness: the Report does not always work effectively as an early warning system. Both countries have traditionally strong democratic institutions, yet Liberties’ 2026 analysis identifies emerging concerns that the Commission either overlooks or describes without translating into targeted recommendations. In Denmark, these include weaknesses in public consultation and pressures on civic space; in Sweden, concerns relate to public participation, civil society funding and growing pressures on human rights defenders.

Similarly, the Reports have the potential to unpack cross-cutting issues and identify where new problems might emerge across the region. For example, the risks posed by artificial intelligence and the threats to the rule of law. This year’s Report provides only scant reference to artificial intelligence, yet it would be strategic to use it to delve into specific issues and learn from the trends.

The missing direction: from backsliding to rule of law restoration

Prevention is only half of the challenge. The experience of Hungary in 2026 raises a different question: what happens when a country changes and promises reform?

Following the defeat of Viktor Orbán and Fidesz after 16 years in power in the April 2026 parliamentary elections, the new Tisza government began a series of reforms. The change in political direction was also reflected in the Commission’s assessments: several recommendations that had been stuck at ‘no progress’ for years moved to ‘some progress’. After years of documenting backsliding, the Commission should consider how the Report can support a country seeking to reverse it.

Simply carrying forward the same list of recommendations from previous years is not enough during a democratic transition, because priorities can change rapidly. Some reforms become urgent, while others can reasonably follow later. The Commission should therefore be able to prioritise reforms during restoration, rather than treating every outstanding recommendation as if the political and institutional context had remained unchanged. Furthermore, adopting new legislation or creating new institutions is only the beginning. The Commission should distinguish laws on paper and reforms in practice: whether new safeguards work, whether new institutions operate independently and whether reforms actually address the problems that led to the original recommendation. This is particularly important in Hungary, where dismantling years of institutional capture cannot be measured simply by counting legislative changes.

Hungary therefore offers more than a hopeful example of rule of law restoration, but it also provides an opportunity to rethink what the Report is for: not only a tool for identifying and responding to backsliding, but also one capable of providing clearer guidance when political change creates an opportunity for democratic restoration.

And Hungary may not remain an isolated case. Parliamentary elections are due in both Slovakia and Italy in 2027, and the political picture in both remains unsettled.

Five years of recommendations: experience and fragmentation

Liberties’ 2026 Gap Analysis should not be considered criticism for its own sake. The Rule of Law Report is an instrument with real potential and has now operated for seven years ( including the five annual cycles containing country-specific recommendations). That is enough time to identify patterns: what works, which problems repeatedly remain unresolved and where the methodology itself needs to evolve. A report that repeatedly diagnoses the same issues without adapting to changing realities risks eventually losing credibility with governments and civil society alike.

The Rule of Law Report is also only one part of the overall toolbox, but it has the potential to provide an overarching framework linking more incisive tools such as infringement proceedings or budget conditionality. Without this framework, the Rule of Law report risks becoming a ‘leftover tool’ — one that only picks up issues if unaddressed by the EU's other mechanisms. As a new cycle begins, rule of law conditionality under the new Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) begins to take shape, and further decline takes place across the region, it is crucial that the Rule of Law Report does not remain a static tool, but one that shapes to a new and changing reality.

Further resources

Download the Gap Analysis 2026 here

Liberties Rule of Law Report 2026: Deepening Rule of Law Crisis in the EU Exposes Shortcomings of Commission Action

Gap Analysis 2026: Why the EU Commission’s Rule of Law Report is not working as an early warning system

Gap Analysis 2025: The EU Rule of Law Report Needs Serious Reform